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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. ERISH1v1AN and 
DARLYNE L. ERISHMAN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
~/IAI~R B. OVERMAN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS 
Case No. 9226 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was originally commenced by Plaintiffs 
for the purpose of recovering possession of certain real 
property owned and conveyed by them to Defendant 
under the te1ms of Escrow Agreement, subsequent to for-
feiture of the Escrow Agreement by the plaintiffs for the 
default of the Defendant, and to further recover payments 
due, attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to the provisions 
of the said Escrow Agreement, and treble damages for un-
lawul detainer by Defendant. Plaintiffs were granted 
possession of the said premises upon the completion of the 
District Court trial; with the Court awarding to the de-
fendant the sums of money paid by her on the purchase 
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price of said property, the value of certain improvements 
made by her upon the said property, interest thereon, and 
costs from which portion of the judgment plaintiffs now 
appeal. 
Appellants and Respondent, on or about the 20th day 
of March, 1957, entered into an Escrow Agreement, by 
the terms of which the party of the second part, Respon-
dent, was to pay the parties of the first part, Appellants, 
the sum of $50.74 per month, on or before the 1st day of 
each month. Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 10 shows that the 
respondent was, after the first four n1onths, continually 
late with payments and in March of 1958 completely 
missed a payment and again in July of 1958, and that she 
made her last payment on August 1, 1958, being at that 
time two payment delinquent. Appellants spoke with res-
pondent about bringing these payments up to date (R 42, 
43, 100) with respondent agreeing to do so. 
Prior to making the August payment, respondent 
write to appellants requesting that they agree to a refin-
ancing proposition to help respondent out of financial 
difficulties in which she found herself because of certain 
alleged improvements she had made in the home (De£. 
Ex 1 ) . Appellant agreed to taking a second mortgage 
and a cash settlement ( Def. Ex. 2), subject to arrange-
ments being made for the making of the delinquent pay-
ments, and ·the receipt of a schedule of the amount that 
would be due under the second Inortgage. 
Subsequently, it was lean1ed by respondent that the 
property was not connected to the sewer and she wrote 
to appellants as follows: 
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"I am perfectly aware that the installation of my 
furnace is n1y responsibility, as is the repair to the 
back steps and the cleaning of the lot. However, I 
do feel that you have some responsibility regarding 
the sewer connection." (De£. ~x. 2) 
Appellants replied that they would make a $100 allowance 
for the connection of the sewer ( Def. Ex. 4) and, as indi-
cated in n~efendant's Exhibit 5, informed respondent, prior 
to September 19, 1958, that they would not accept a 
second 1nortgage. 
Respondent wrote appellants ( Def. Ex. 5) that she 
had consulted an attorney and had been told that the cost 
of the sewer connection should be all appellants' ( Def. Ex. 
5) and requested that the sewer connection costs be 
credited on the Escrow Agreement. 
Respondent made no further payments on the Escrow 
Agreement and was informed the 1st part of December 
that if she did not bring her payments up to date, appel-
lants would declare a forfeiture of the contract. Respon-
dent's response was to inform appellants' attorney that 
she had tried to secure financing, had been unsuccessful 
and had asked the real estate department of the company 
where she worked to sell the home. She also stated that 
she would start reducing the balance due on the contract 
by monthly payments, and this as late as February 5, 1959 
(De£. Ex 6). 
There were no payments made on the Escrow Agree-
ment and on the 12th day of March, 1959, appellants 
caused Notice Declaring Escrow Agreement Null and 
Void to be served on the escrow agent, the First Security 
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Bank of Utah, N. A., Logan, Utah, and Notice of Forfei-
ture of Escrow Agreement to be served upon Man· B. 
Overman (Tr. 5, 6) 
Respondent refused to vacate the premises after the 
forfeiture and thereupon, on the 22nd day of May, 1959, 
plaintiffs filed their Complaint ( Tr. 1) seeking resitution 
and possession of the premises, treble damages for rentals 
accn1ed during the period of time respondent held the 
premises, for payments actually due on the premises, and 
for attorney's fees and costs. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
In connection with this appeal, Plaintiff contends: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 3 AND 7; 
ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NUMBERED 1, 2, 3, 
AND 4; AND ITS JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE 
DEFENDANT. 
A. THE EVIDENCE IN FACT, AND· CONTRA.RY 
TO THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 3, 
SHOWS THAT THE MATTER OF WHETHER OR NOT 
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS CONNECTED 
TO THE SEWER WAS IMMATERIAL TO THE RES-
PONDENT; THE LAW, WHEN SUCH IS THE EVI-
D·ENCE, DOES NOT JUSTIFY A RECISSION, CON-
TRARY TO THE COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW 
NUMBER 1. 
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B. THE EVIDENCE, CONrfRARY TO THE 
COURT'S FINDING OF FACT NUJ\1BER 7, IS CON-
TRADICTORY AND INCONCLUSIVE AND FA.ILS TO 
SUPPOI\T THE COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW 
NUMBER 2 AS TI-IE AJ\!IOUNT IN WHICH THE IJ\!1-
PROVEMENTS J\JADE BY RESPONDENT ENHAN-
CED TI-IE \T ALUE OF THE PROPERTY. 
C. TI-IE EVIDENCE SHOWS, AS IS INDICATED 
BY THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT NUJ\1BER 5, 
Tl-IAT THE RESPONDENT WAIVED ANY MISRE-
PRESENTATION THERE J\IIAY HAVE BEEN AND 
SHOWED BY HER ACTIONS THAT SHE ELECTED 
TO SEEK DAJ\1AGES; THE LAW IN SUCH CASES 
BEING, CON1,RARY TO THE COURT'S CONCLUS-
IONS OF LAW NUMBERS 1 AND 3, THAT RESPOND-
ENT THEN HAD NO RIGHT TO RESCIND. 
POINT 2 
THAT THE PARTIES HAD IN FACT SIGNED AN 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND AGREEMENT TO 
PURCHASE, WHICH WAS A BINDING CONTRACT 
UPON THE PARTIES, AND WHICH CONTRACT DID 
NOT PURPORT TO CONVEY A HOUSE CONNECTED 
TO A SEWER LINE. 
POINT 3 
A. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
ING OF Fi-\CT NUMBER 8 WHEREIN IT FOUND 
"THAT EXCEPT AS ABOVE EXCEPTED, ALL OF THE 
ALLEGATIONS OF COUNTERCLAIM ARE TRUE 
AND CORRECT AND THOSE CONTAINED IN THE 
COMPLAINT INCORRECT." 
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B. THE COURT FURTHER ERRED IN MAKING 
ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBER 1 WHEREIN 
IT STATED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED 
TO A RECISSION OF THE CONTRACT ON THE 
GROUNDS TI-IAT THE PREMISES WERE Iv1ATERI-
ALLY MISREPRESENTED~ TO HER, FOR THE REA-
SON AND ON THE GROUND THAT THE CONTRACT 
RELIED UPON BY 'fHE D·EFENDANT HAD BEEN 
PREVIOUSLY TERMINATED AS ALLEGED IN 
PLAIN.TIFFS' C0~1PLAINT (TR.1) AND ADMITTED 
IN DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM. (TR. 7) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
·THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBERED 3, 7 AND 
8; ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NU!v1BERED 1, 2, 3 
AND 4, AND: ITS JUDGMENT AND DECREE IN 
FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT. 
A. THE EVIDENCE IN FACT, AND CONTRARY 
TO THE COURT~S FINDING OF FACT NO.3, SHOWS 
THAT THE MATTER OF WHETHER OR NOT THE 
PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS CONNECTED TO 
TI-IE SEWER WAS I~\1rv1ATERIAL TO THE RESPOND-
EN'T; THE LAW, WHEN SUCH IS THE EVIDENCE~ 
DOES NOT JUSTIFY A RECISSION, CONTRARY TO 
THE COURT'C CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBER 1. 
There is no evidence whatsoever in the record to 
show that respondent "made particular note" (Finding of 
Fact No. 3) of the statement that the property was con-
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nected to the Logan City Sewer line. In fact, the testi-
n1onv would indicate the contrarv. 
. ~ 
Q But you did go do\vn and investigate some of the 
items on the listing agreement, didn't you? 
A That's right. 
Q To make sure they were there and to make sure 
everything was all right. Did you contact anyone 
at all about the sewer connection? 
A No, I did not. 
Q You didn't call the City? 
A No. 
Q You didnt' ask Mr. Baugh about it other than to 
observe the listing? 
A Yes, I did. That is, I didn't ask him. He quoted 
to me that "I have a home that is connected to the 
sewer, it's down close to the school, it's within 
walking distance from town," and he said, it's 
completely furnished." 
Q Now, did you ask Mr. Erisman about the home? 
A No. 
Q Did you ask Mrs. Erisman about the home? 
A No. 
Q Did you talk with them at all? 
A No ... 
The law under these circumstances is well established. 
"A "mistake of fact," warranting cancellation of a 
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contract for sale of land ... must be material to con-
tract and affect substance thereof, and must affect 
both parties in reference to the same fact which, 
though connected with agreement, is merely inci-
dental and not a part of its subject matter or essen-
tial to any of its terms." 
Patterson vs. McComas, 37 N E 2d 655 
" ... before granting relief it must be made to appear 
that the fact concerning which the mistake was made 
was one that animated and controlled the conduct of 
the parties. The court must be satisfied that but for 
the mistake the complainant would not have assumed 
the obligation fron1 which he seeks to be relieved." 
9 Am. Jur. - Cancellation of Instruments, Sec. 32, P. 
377 
"To entitle one either to maintain an action of deceit 
because of false representations or to rescind a K 
made made in relance thereon, it must appear that 
such representations were made for the purpose of 
influencing the complaining party, and w/ the intent 
that they be acted upon by him, or in a manner 
naturally calculated to induce him to act upon them." 
23 Am. Jur. - Fraud and Deceit,~~ec. 117, P. 902. 
The evidence further shows that respondent was 
active in business, that she had worked in various depart-
ments of a real estate and loaning business; that she had 
been responsible for drawing legal papers, for closing and 
processing loans ( R 44, 45, 46) and in general was most 
familiar with all, or nearly all, phases of real estate tran-
sactions. 
The respondent thus had every opportunity, and 
every reason, because of her knowledge and experience, 
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to insert the matter of the sewer connection in the space 
provided, had she considered it important. 
American Jurisprudence in Volume 23, Fraud and 
Deceit, Section 112, page 896, sets forth the general rule 
under such circumstances: 
"The contract itself may show that certain representa-
tions were not regarded as material, as where the 
complaining party could have inserted provisions 
therein to protect himself against the contingencies 
covered by the representations, but failed to do so. 
The preliminary contract of the parties in this case 
did not show the sewer connection to be considered ma-
terial. It therefore appears that the verdict of the jury 
as to the materiality of the sewer connection, the Court's 
Finding of Fact Number 3 and Its Conclusion of Law 
Number 1, particularly wherein the Court states that the 
"defendant's signing of the real estate contract was in-
duced by a material misrepresentation of the plaintiffs 
to the effect that the sewer on said premises was connected 
to the Logan City Sewer," are wholly and completely un-
supported by the evidence. 
POINT I 
B 
THE EVIDENCE, CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S 
FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 7, IS CONTRADIC-
TORY AND INCONCLUSIVE AND FAILS TO SUP-
PORT THE COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW NUM-
BER 2 AS TO THE AMOUNT IN WHICH THE IM-
PROVEMENTS MADE BY RESPONDENT ENHAN-
CED THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY. 
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There is considerable confusion in the record as to 
the value of the capital improvement placed upon the 
premises by the respondent. 
Mr. Glen P. Baugh, the real estate agent who sold the 
home to respondent, was asked by the Court ( R 67) : 
"How much would that house, how much could it be 
n1oved for on time?" 
A On the going market? 
The Court: Yes. In round figures. 
A Well, I'd have to -
The Court: Just a round figure. 
A Oh, in round figures on comparing it with other 
homes, I'd say maybe fifty-five. 
This figure, quoted by respondent's witness, is $600 
less than the $6100 for which the property was originally 
sold. 
Another of respondent's witnesses, George Judah, 
testified ( R 64) that the home should go ''somewhere in 
the neighborhood of around $7,000.00." 
The record shows that appellants purchased a new 
furnace in the spring· of 1956; that a heat survey was made 
of the home an a furnace of reputable make, and larger 
than would be considered adequate, was installed ( R 72, 
73, 7 4). It is true that insulation should have been placed 
in the attic, at the cost of $65 ( R 7 4), for greatest heat 
efficiency. Respondent was informed of this at the time~ 
or shorty after, she purchased the home ( R 81, 82). 
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Respondent testified that her change over to natural 
gas was motivated by the cost of the propane gas - $43 
per n1onth during the three coldest months ( R 47). 
This testimony was refuted by that of Grant W. 
Catnpbell who delivered gas to respondent and who pro-
duced bills showing the following charges for gas over a 
period of 1 year ( R70, 71). 
Q Did you deliver propane to the residence of Mrs. 
Overn1an? 
A Yes, tna'am. 
Q And did you keep a record of the costs of heating? 
.A I have the bills that she used while she was there, 
heating. 
Q And would you give us those figures? 
The Cou1t: By month you mean? 
Q Yes. Give us the figures that you have as to the 
costs of heating. 
A The figures that I have only carries for one year. 
Q Well, that's fine. 
A On October twelfth there was 250 gallons of pro-
pane delivered at a cost of $43.35. On December 
19th there was 219 gallons delivered, $37.98. On 
January 28th there was 245 gallons delivered, 
$42.49. 
The Court: What year is this? 
A Fifty-six-fifty-seven. 
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Q Are these deliveries to Mrs. Overman? 
A Yes, rna' am. 
Q All right. 
A On March 16th is 225, $39.02. And on May 4th 
was 250, October 2nd there was 171, $30.30. 
A review of these figures reveals that respondent did 
not pay $43 per month for propane gas for any one month 
and that the average cost per month for one year was 
approximated $17.10. 
The evidence therefore shows that respondent did 
not enhance the value of the home to the extent she testi-
fied ( R 56) by her installation of a new furnace and the 
change over to natural gas. 
The record also shows that some of the improvements 
were made by respondent after the property was discov-
ered not to be connected to a sewer line. ( R 41) 
Q Now, you testified that you purchased materials 
worth a hundred three dollars. Will you explain 
to us what all that included? A storm door-
A One hundred twenty-three dollars. 
Q Yes, $123, excuse me. 
A That included the celotex or plaster board, what-
ever it is, for the back porch, and the lumber for 
the back porch, the two ceilings that had to be 
put in, and the storm door. 
Q And the labor was $81 for all those repairs? 
A For all of the1n. 
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Q When did you put in the furnace, Mrs. Overman? 
A It was the latter part of June or the first of July. 
Q When did you repair the steps? 
A After the sewer was in. That was in late Sep-
tember. 
Q When did you repair the cracked ceilings? 
A At the same time as the steps were repaired. 
Q When did you put the storm door in? 
A The satne time as the steps. 
Q So all those improvements you made on your 
home were made after the sewer was connected? 
A That's right. 
The Trial Court does not take into consideration in 
its finding of Fact Number 7 and Conclusion of Law 
Number 2, which Finding and Conclusion relate to the 
making of improvements and the time the improvements 
were made. The Court refers to the improvements having 
been made prior to the time respondent was informed by 
appellants of appellants' refusal to pay for the sewer and 
to go along with the refinancing arrangements. However, 
if respondent is seeking her remedy in rescission for mis-
representation, the proper measure of damages is set forth 
in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 37, Page 624, Sections 
141 and 142, entitled Nature of Contract and Nature of 
Property: 
The damages recoverable must have proximately re-
sulted from the fraud. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-18-
Expenses unnecessarily incurred, as where voluntarily 
incurred after discovery of the fraud, cannot be 
recovered. 
A defrauded person may recover such amount as will 
compensate him for the loss occasioned by the fraud 
and damages are ordinarily computed with reference 
to the time and place of the transaction and fixed as 
of the date on which the fraud was discovered. 
POINT 1 
c 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS, AS IS INDICATED BY 
THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 5, 
THAT THE RESPONDENT WAIVED ANY MISREPRE-
SENTATION THERE MAY HAVE BEEN, AND 
SHOWED BY HER ACTIONS THAT SHE ELECTED 
TO SEEK DAMAGES, THE LAW IN SUCH CASES 
BEING, CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S CONCLUS-
IONS OF LAW NU~1BERS 1 AND 3, THAT RESPON-
DENT THEN HAD NO RIGHT TO RESCIND. 
That respondent did not intend, or express any intent, 
to rescind the Escrow Agreement at any time, prior to the 
filing of a counter claim ( Tr. 7) by her attorneys, is 
clearly shown by respondent's own testimony (Def. Ex. 
3, 5, 6; R 42, 43 ) 
A An then I told him that another thing had arisen 
since my last letter, and that was the sewer had 
gone out and - or that I had to connect to the 
sewer, and I asked hiin what he wanted to do 
about it. 
Q You asked him what he wanted to do about it? 
A Yes. 
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Q Did you tell hhn that you didn't want to keep the 
property any more since you had found out it 
wasn't on the sewer? 
A No. 
Q Did you tell him you wanted all your money back 
because you hadn't got what you bargained for? 
A No. 
Q Now, after you had told Mr. E1isman that the 
Sewer had gone out, in that letter, what did you 
do next? 
A I went ahead and negotiated for its repair. We 
couldn't live in the place as it was. 
Q. I see. But you intended on continuing to live in 
the house? 
A Yes. 
Q When did you decide, Mrs. Overman, that you 
didn't want the property any more? 
A I don't know whether I ever decided I didn't want 
the property any more. 
The law is clear that a vendee wishing to rescind must 
give notice thereof and if she fails to do so within a reason-
able length of time, or continues to act as though the 
property were her own, she thereby waives any right she 
may have had to rescind the Agreement, and must then 
proceed with her legal remedy for damages. 
"In Carpenter v. First Trust & Sav. Bank ( 1936) 54 P 
( 2d) 495 (California), where it seems that the in-
stalment purchaser had become entitled to rescind 
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and recover back money paid ... it was held that since 
(according to the findings of the trial court as sup-
ported by the evidence ) the purchaser, after discov-
ery of the facts justifying rescission, had conducted 
himself as though the contract subsisted and had 
given assurance of being able to make his payments, 
and his contention that his failure to rescind promptly 
had resulted from assurances of the vendor's agent 
that the improvements would be replaced, was, in 
view of competent evidence, rejected by the trial 
court, the right to rescind was lost." 
134 ALR 1064 
((.'A contract of purchase of land induced by false and 
fradulent representations, or mutual mistake, is void-
able and not void, and if injured party, \Vith know-
ledge of the false and fradulent representations, or 
mutual mistake) exercises dominion over the property 
and treats it as his own, he waives his right to rescind. 
Kerns v. Bank of Manitou, 242 P. 2d 817 (Colorado.) 
24 Am. Jur., Sec. 210, P. 36 
'((.Rescission by a vendee implies that he must in some 
way give notice of intention to rescind." 
Hawkins vs. Stoffers ( 1929), P. 452 (Wyoming) 
"A notice given by the vendee to the vendor which 
was not intended as a rescission of the contract when 
given, cannot be so considered thereafter.~, 
Eckhause vs. Berwyn Estate ( 1929) 146 A 65 ( N. J.) 
Where purchasers pf apartment units did not deliver 
up the premises and demand down payment upon 
discovery that premises allegedly were unfit for habi-
tation as rental units, purchasers could not rely on 
fraud to defeat action by vendors to recover posses-
sion and for forfeiture of amount paid under agree-
ment to purchase. ((.'It should be observed that as to 
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the premises being unfit for habitation as rental units, 
the defendants upon the discovery of said conditions 
failed to offer to deliver up the pren1ises and demand 
the down pa yrncnt. If defendant intended to rely 
up fraud as alleged, such action would have been 
essential. 
"Defendants can hardly be heard to say, "we know 
we didn't carrv out our contract and we know that 
we were give1; 18 months to try and comply with it, 
and we know that plaintiffs didn't want the property 
back, but we think that plaintiffs should take a further 
loss and refund to us what we paid because we are 
being penalized." We see no occasion for the inter-
vention of equity to impose a further loss on plaintiffs, 
nor can we see that the remedy of forfeiture, reluc-
tantly accepted by plaintiff, is inequitable." 
Peck vs. Judd, 326 P. 2nd 712; 7 Utah 2nd 420 
See also 12 Am. Jur. - Contacts, Sec. 447, time when 
right to rescind must be exercised, page 1029. 
So, in view of the Court's Finding of Fact No. 5, 
which Finding is a1nply supported by the testimony and 
Exhibits pertaining to respondent's actions after discover-
ing appellants' alleged misrepresentation, \vhich actions 
come well within the puview of the numerous cases cited 
above, the trial Court surely erred in entering its Con-
clusions of Law Numbers 1 and 3. 
POINT 2 
THAT THE PARTIES HAD IN FACT SIGNED AN 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND AGREEMENT TO 
PURCHASE, WHICI-I WAS A BINDING CONTRACT 
UPON THE PARTIES, AND WHICH CONTRACT DID 
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NOT PURPORT TO CONVEY A HOUSE CONNECTED 
TO A SEWER LINE. 
This item merits special attention. 
The preliminary contract signed by the parties (Pl. 
Ex. 8) contains an integration clause, wherein the pa1ties 
specifically agree that the terms thereof constitute the 
entire preliminary contract between the purchaser and 
seller and that no verbal statements made by anyone 
relative to the transaction shall be construed to be a part 
of the transaction. 
Professor Ronan E. Degnan, had made an excellent 
summarization of the Utah law on this point in his article 
"Parol Evidence - Utah Version," 5 Utah Law Review, 
No. 2, quoting from page 162: 
"This final agreement is the agreement of the parties; 
it is the jural act to which the law attributes changes 
in legal relationships. In short, the later agreement 
supersedes all former. Thus former negotiations or 
even agreements are excluded from a trial not because 
evidence as to their existence would be untrustwo1thy 
but because they are legally immaterial; if their ex-
existence were proved or even admitted it would not 
affect the rules of the law to be applied in dete1mining 
the disposition of the case." 
POINT 3 
A 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
OF FACT NUMBER 8 WHEREIN IT FOUND "THAT 
EXCEPT AS ABOVE EXCEPTED ALL OF THE ALLE-
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CATIONS OF COUNTERCLAIM ARE TRUE AND 
CORRECT AND TI-IOSE CONTAINED INTI-IE CO~·'l­
PLAINT INCORRECT." 
B 
THE COURT FURTHER ERRED, IN MAKING ITS 
CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBER 1 WHEREIN IT 
STATED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO 
A RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACT ON THE 
GROUNDS THAT THE PREMISES WERE MATER-
IALLY MISREPRESENTED TO HER, FOR THE REA-
SON AND ON THE GROUND THAT THE CONTRACT 
RELIED UPON BY 'fi-lE D·EFENDANT HAD BEEN 
PREVIOUSLY TERMINATED AS ALLEGED IN 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT (Tr. 1) AND AD·MITTED 
IN DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM (Tr. 7) 
The complaint of the plaintiffs alleges as follows 
(Tr. 1): 
"5. That upon the continuing default of the defend-
and, pursuant to the terms of said Escrow Agreement, 
plaintiffs caused notice to be served upon defendant 
on the 12th day of March, 1959, of the forefeiture and 
termination of said Escrow Agreement, and requested 
in said notice that defendant forthwith vacate said 
. '' pren11ses. 
The answer of the defendant to this allegation was a 
denial of any continuing default on the part of defendant, 
and an admission of the balance of the said Paragraph 5 
(Tr. 7). 
Thus respondent has actually admitted the forfeiture 
of the Escrow Agreement between the parties. 
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That the fodeiture of the Escrow agreement was 
properly carried out both with regard to the provisions 
of the Escrow Agreement and the Laws of the State of 
Utah, (Forcible Entry and Detainer, Title 78, Chapter 36, 
Utah Code Annnotated, 1953) will appear from the 
Notices which were served upon the respondent and the 
escrow agent (Tr. 5, 6). 
Respondent has denied in her answer (Tr. 7) a con-
tinuing default, and has also stated in her answer, as a 
part of her further defense, that she immediately dis-
continued all payment under the agreement immediately 
after discovering that the home had never been connected 
to the City sewer line, thus inferring that she ceased mak-
ing payments on the Escrow Agreement because of the 
sewer trouble. The evidence contradicts this inference. 
In the first place, she was behind two payments when she 
made her last payment, and secondly, respondent, in her 
own exhibit (De£. Ex. 6) states as follows: 
"This month I will start reducing the balance due on 
the contract by monthly payments but the home is to 
be sold as soon as possible." 
The necessary conclusion, then, is that the Escrow 
Agreement having been legally and completely fodeited 
by appellants because of the default of the respondent, 
there was no existing contract for the Court to rescind, as 
it purported to do in its said Conclusion of Law Number 1; 
that is was, therefore, further error for the Cou1t to con-
clude, as it did in its conclusion of Law Number 3, that 
the respondent could be restored to her former position, 
and for the Cou1t to enter its Judgment and Decree declar-
ing the contract to be null and void. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-25-
The Minnesota case of West vs. vValker, ( 1930 ), 231 
N. W. 826, 74 A. L. R. 165, though dealing with a fact 
situation distinct from that of the present case, arrives 
at a legal conclusion directly in point. The plaintiff there 
had been induced to enter into a contract for the purchase 
of a building and lot. He became delinquent in his pay-
ments, whereupon defendant, complying strictly with the 
laws pertaining to forfeiture, cancelled the contract. The 
plaintiff then brought action for damages, claiming fraud. 
The Court held: 
"We think the instant case is not distinguishable from 
Olson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. 126 Minn. 229, 148 
N. W. 67, L. R. A. 1915F, 962, where it was held that 
a right of action for damages for fradulent represen-
tations inducing the purchase of land upon executory 
contract does not survive the cancellation of the con-
tract. . . When the cancellation is completed, there 
remains to neither vendee nor vendor any cause of 
action against the other growing out of the land tran-
saction, except that the vendee might sue for money 
had and received. . . " 
Thus the decision in the cited case would go beyond 
the argument urged by appellants that a completed for-
feiture of a contract terminates the contract, leaving no 
valid agreement in existence to be rescinded, and holds 
that not only would the contract be terminated by the 
forfeiture, but that a plaintiff would also lose his remedy 
at law for damages suffered because of any misrepresenta-
tions that may have been made in obtaining the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, appellants respectfully request the 
Court to reverse the decision of the Honorable Lewis Jones 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-26-
rescinding the contract between the parties hereto and 
placing the respondent in status quo by awarding to her 
all sums paid under the Escrow Agreement, less a reason-
able rental, and the value of improvements placed upon 
the premises by her, for the reasons and upon the grounds: 
that even though the sewer listing was a misrepresentation, 
respondent did not, by her actions, nor according to her 
testimony, consider it material; that whether the home 
was or was not connected to the sewer line did not animate 
and control the conduct of the parties, nor determine the 
fact of contracting, and was therefore not material; that 
the parties had signed a preliminary contract for sale 
which did not require appellants to deliver a home con-
nected to the sewer, which contract contained the entire 
agreement between the parties, and which could not be 
altered by outside statements; that inasmuch as the Es-
crow Agreement had been forfeited by proper procedure, 
there was no existing agreement for the District Trial 
Court to declare rescinded by respondent; that the evi-
dence is clear that respondent elected to recover her dam-
ages rather than avoid the agreement, until the time of 
filing her counterclaim, and by her actions waived what 
right she may have had to rescind the conrract; and for 
the further reason that the sums awarded respondent for 
her equity in the property and for the value of the im-
provements placed thereon by her cannot be justified by 
the record. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Sherma Hansen. 
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